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Unsung Heroes:  Constituency Election Agents in British General Elections 
 
 
Abstract 
Despite their central role in the electoral process, constituency agents have been 
largely overlooked by political scientists and this article seeks to rectify the 
omission. It sketches the origins and development of the role of agent from the 
late nineteenth century and suggests that a serious re-think of the role took place 
in the 1990s.  Survey-based evidence about the social characteristics of agents is 
presented confirming that they are largely middle-aged, middle-class, well-
educated men.  They are also becoming more experienced, offer realistic 
assessments of the impact of constituency campaigning and, arguably, many take 
a long-term view of how their party’s support can be maximised. 
 
 
Introduction 
At British general elections, every candidate in every constituency is required to appoint an 
election agent and, as Blackburn (1995: 270) suggests, these agents are the second most 
important figures in constituency-level electioneering, after the candidates.   In the first place, 
they are legally responsible for the conduct and financial management of campaigns.  Under 
the terms of the Representation of People Act 1983, the agent must use ‘all reasonable means 
to prevent corrupt or illegal practices at the election’. In addition, legitimate campaign 
spending can only be incurred and paid by (or with the express authorisation of) the election 
agent. No one else is allowed to spend money in promoting a candidate’s election.  In the 
event of any breach of election rules, the agent is personally liable and a result could be 
declared void.  Since 2001, agents have also had the significant additional responsibility of 
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ensuring compliance with the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act which, among 
other things, requires them to provide the Electoral Commission with details of donations 
made to their campaign. 
 
In addition to these legal requirements, however, most agents also take on the task of 
organising and leading the election campaign in the constituency.  The agent sets up the 
campaign headquarters, recruits the campaign team, organises the preparation of the election 
address and other literature and generally ensures that all necessary preparations are made.  
He or she usually then runs the campaign itself and is the main contact with parties’ national 
and regional headquarters.  Among a multitude of tasks, and as well as dealing with finance, 
the agent will co-ordinate canvassing and the distribution of leaflets, organise the candidate’s 
activities, liaise with headquarters on visits by key party figures, and organise and co-ordinate 
the efforts of volunteer campaign workers throughout the campaign and, in particular, on 
polling day itself.
1
 
 
Clearly, then, agents are at the very heart of the parties’ campaigning machinery in the 
constituencies.  Moreover, it is now widely accepted that the quality of the constituency 
campaigns mounted under the leadership of election agents can make a significant difference 
to how well their party performs (see, for example Denver et al., 2004; Pattie and Johnston, 
2003; Whiteley and Seyd, 2003).  It seems not unreasonable, therefore, to think of agents as 
‘heroes’ of the electoral process in Britain, especially given that the great majority of them 
take on their legal responsibilities and undertake the arduous task of running campaigns on an 
entirely voluntary basis. 
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Yet agents are largely overlooked in academic studies of elections and to that extent they are 
‘unsung’ heroes.  In Kavanagh’s (1970) work on constituency electioneering, for example, 
election agents merit only one page reference in the index and only a few mentions in the 
entire text.  The Nuffield study of the 2001 election makes only one substantive comment on 
the role of agents (Butler and Kavanagh, 2002: 212) and, as far as we are aware, there is no 
recent published research on the characteristics and attitudes of agents.
2
 
 
In this article we seek to rectify this omission by exploring the changing roles of agents.  As 
we shall see, constituency campaigning and the importance attached to it by the parties 
changed significantly in the 1990s.  In these new circumstances, the parties began to 
reconsider the role of agents and to find new ways of organising constituency campaigns.  
We also use data derived from three surveys of agents carried out immediately following the 
general elections of 1992, 1997 and 2001 to provide some evidence about the changing 
demographic characteristics and experience of agents as well as their opinions on the utility 
of campaigning and about the purposes of the campaigns that they organise.  First, however, 
we briefly sketch the origins and evolution of the post of constituency election agent. 
 
The constituency election agent: origins and development of the role 
The position of constituency election agent as we now know it can be traced back to the 
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883.  Before then, candidates had regularly employed 
agents both to maximise the numbers of their supporters who were registered to vote and to 
manage campaigns.  Most of these were solicitors, often belonging to firms specialising in 
political business, some being local and others coming from large firms in London.  Some 
served regularly in the same constituency – Hanham (1978: 236) even suggests that in many 
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counties the position became hereditary – but it was not a full-time occupation.  The role of 
the agent at this point is succinctly summarised by Hanham (236):  
 
The election agent was essentially a man who organised a team of up to several 
thousand paid workers, so that they got through the essential work of canvassing and 
making arrangements for taking electors to the polling booths with the minimum of 
friction, with the maximum of noise and publicity, and with as few breaches of the 
law as seemed to him desirable. 
 
Dickens’ account of the fictional Eatanswill election in The Pickwick Papers (ch.13) is a 
colourful illustration of how elections were run at this time.  There was extensive 
intimidation, bribery and corruption, and the 1883 Act was only one of a series of measures 
by which Parliament attempted to stamp this out. The Act introduced strict limits on election 
expenditure in constituencies and, in order to enforce these limits, laid down rules for making 
payments and for declaring election expenses.  The responsibility for complying with these 
rules was laid on a single individual – the election agent. 
 
Hanham argues that ‘a new class of full-time agents had come into existence by 1885’ (240), 
although this was the culmination of developments that had been going on for some time.  In 
particular, of course, the extension of the franchise and the growth of constituency electorates 
had been making the whole business of organising elections more complex.  Solicitor-agents, 
associated with the old corrupt system, gave way to what was essentially a new profession, 
particularly at first in the Conservative party in the north of England.  These new agents were 
appointed on a permanent basis to maintain the party’s organisation in the constituency, to 
run the party office, to liaise with the candidate and local worthies, to help with local election 
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campaigns, and to prepare for and manage the general election campaign.  A North of 
England Conservative Agent’s Association was founded as early as 1872, almost 20 years 
before the setting up of the National Society of Conservative Agents in 1891.  Things 
changed more slowly in the Liberal party, but followed the same pattern.  The 1883 Act in 
effect gave a legal foundation to these developments.  Swaddle (1990) couples it with the 
Reform Act of 1884, which further extended the franchise, and the Redistribution Act of 
1885, which made single-member constituencies the norm, and argues that ‘the profession of 
full-time party agents, in the modern sense, was largely a product of the reforms of 1883-85’ 
(p. 73). 
 
Since the late nineteenth century election agents have remained key figures in constituency 
campaigns.  What has changed, however, has been the importance attributed to constituency 
campaigns by commentators and the parties themselves. Until about the first decade of the 
twentieth century there effectively was no national campaign – a general election consisted 
simply of the individual campaigns mounted by candidates in the various constituencies that 
were contested.  Over most of the following century, however, the national campaign 
gradually grew in importance and there was a corresponding down-grading of the 
significance of constituency campaigns.  There were two main reasons for this.   On the one 
hand, the further growth of constituency electorates and the maintenance of the tight and 
effective spending limits inaugurated by the 1883 Act meant that it was difficult for local 
organisations to mount effective campaigns that would reach all of the voters.  More 
important in the long run, however, was a series of developments in techniques of mass 
communication which made it much more cost-effective for the parties to mount national 
campaigns (for which there were no expenditure limits) – first came mass circulation 
newspapers, then radio and finally, and most decisively, television.  Already by the 1950s, 
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there had been a marked decline in the status and significance of constituency campaigns, 
prompting the Nuffield study of the 1959 election to comment that they were ‘relics of a 
bygone age’ (Butler and Rose, 1960: 119).  The widespread ownership of television and the 
development of television as the principal means of political communication by the political 
parties only served to confirm this view. The election agent might have remained a key figure 
in constituency campaigns but commentators were sceptical, to say the least, about whether 
constituency campaigns mattered. 
 
Nonetheless, the numbers of full-time agents remained very large throughout the first half of 
the twentieth century. The Nuffield study of the 1950 election (Nicholas, 1951: 24-41) 
reported that the Conservatives had well over 500 full-time agents – the backbone of what at 
that time was widely regarded as the most effective party election machine.  But even Labour 
– whose organisation was notoriously ramshackle – had 279, while the Liberals (who were 
about to be almost extinguished as a political force) had 350 paid agents during the election.
3
  
This may well have been the high point for full-time agents, however.  Since then, their 
numbers have declined fairly steeply in all three parties, although the Conservatives have 
always had most.  Precise and authoritative figures are hard to come by but the Nuffield 
studies suggest that Conservative numbers were down to ‘about 300’ by 1987, whereas 
Labour had 70 full-time agents in 1979 and only 43 in 1983.   
 
What these trends reflect is essentially a de-professionalisation of the role of agent, and the 
reasons are not hard to understand.  Only the largest and most affluent of constituency party 
organisations could afford the salary of a full-time official; although a few might move on to 
positions in their party’s regional or national organisation, the great majority of full-time 
agents had no prospect of promotion to increase responsibility or salary; and the declining 
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status of constituency campaigning (and perhaps of politics too) would make the job less 
attractive.  The trend, then, was very much towards volunteer agents, appointed by candidates 
simply to run a campaign.  These volunteers might typically be local councillors or 
constituency party officials – people with plenty of knowledge of the local political scene and 
perhaps years of experience of working in election campaigns.    There would also be many 
cases, as there had been even in the heyday of the professional agent, where the party was 
very weak and a candidate was standing merely to show the flag, in which it would be a 
matter of finding someone – frequently a member of the candidate’s family or a friend – who 
could be cajoled into doing the job. 
 
Changes in the 1990s 
But the story does not end there.  During the 1990s the parties (and academics) began to re-
assess the importance of constituency campaigning.  A dealigned electorate was more 
receptive to persuasion and mobilisation by the parties, and technological developments – 
especially computers - significantly improved the tools available for fighting local 
campaigns.  As a result, central party staff began to take constituency campaigning much 
more seriously.  
 
Party managers realised that there was an important job to be done in the constituencies but 
they also increasingly came (or were forced) to the view that employing full-time agents 
locally or relying entirely on voluntary agents is not the best way to do it – even although the 
law still requires the appointment of a local agent.  The main problems have already been 
referred to - parties lacked the resources to employ very many permanent full-time agents and 
the job itself was not very attractive to well-qualified professionals.  One response by the 
parties was that national party professionals sought to exercise much greater control over 
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local campaigning by managing key constituency campaigns in crucial respects and 
integrating them much more closely into the national effort.  What emerged over the decade 
was, in effect, a new relationship between the national and local campaigns (Denver et al., 
2003)  A second response, as we shall see, has been to try to ensure that volunteers have the 
training necessary to develop the organisational skills and abilities that can profitably be 
brought to bear at constituency level. 
 
In addition, however, all three parties have looked for other ways to ensure that professional 
expertise is available to key constituency campaigns.  Since 1997 the Conservatives have 
begun to employ and part-finance local agents from the centre. They still had around 300 
traditional locally-employed agents in 1992, but by 1997 that number had fallen to around 
200, with now an additional 100 employed from Conservative Central Office.  By 2001 there 
had been a further marked decline: there were now only 60 traditional full-timers, with about 
40 centrally-appointed agents.  But the party has also begun to make more radical changes.  
Following the 1997 election, it abolished its regional tier of organisation and moved to a 
system in which Area Campaign Directors had responsibility for a number of seats, usually 
covering one or two counties.   
 
Labour’s response has been rather different.  The funding available to MPs to hire staff has 
increased quite rapidly over the past few years, and in a number of cases researchers or 
personal assistants appointed by MPs (or in some cases MEPs) have then served as agents at 
the next election.  More generally, however, the party has begun to appoint special organisers 
– people specially recruited, trained and appointed on short-term contracts - to particular 
target constituencies (or groups of constituencies) in the run-up to elections, to oversee 
preparations and then to organise the campaign itself.  Quantifying the numbers here is a little 
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difficult: in some cases special organisers would actually take on the role of agent, but in 
others they would concentrate on giving guidance to voluntary agents in a number of seats.  
On the basis of information drawn from several sources, we estimate that in 1992 Labour had 
around 70 traditional full-time agents (an increase of about 30 on 1983), with 20 special 
organisers servicing a range of constituencies; in 1997, the number of full-time agents was 
around 40, but nearly all of the 90 key seats identified by the party had a special organiser (or 
so it was claimed); in 2001 there had been a further fall in the number full-time agents, to 
around 30, but again every ‘priority’ seat had the services of a special organiser, although, 
since there were 148 of these seats, there had to be some ‘doubling up’. 
 
The Liberal Democrats do not have the resources to undertake programmes on this scale but, 
even so, in 2001 party headquarters provided financial assistance to allow paid agents or part-
time organisers to be employed in key seats.  About 100 constituencies had some form of 
paid assistance, although in many cases this involved sharing an organiser with other seats.  
In addition two Assistant Campaign Directors were appointed at national level to assist and 
encourage the development of effective constituency campaign organisations. 
 
In an earlier piece of work Denver and Hands (2002) suggested that developments in 
constituency campaigning in the 1990s could be seen as an example of ‘Post-Fordism’.   
Changes in campaign strategies and methods were comparable to changes in production 
processes – from mass production using relatively unskilled labour (Fordism) to the 
production of specialist products and niche marketing, involving hi-tech equipment and a 
highly-trained, versatile work force (Post-Fordism).  Although the analogy is somewhat 
speculative, it sheds some light on changes in the role of election agents and in the 
organisation of constituency campaigns.  One of the watchwords of Post-Fordism is ‘flexible 
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specialisation’ and campaigns have become more flexible.  The parties have moved away 
from a traditional model in which the agent co-ordinates the carrying out of fairly simple and 
repetitive tasks (house-to-house canvassing, leafleting, getting out the vote on polling day) to 
a strategy which uses advanced technology and a greater range of expertise to focus 
differentiated campaigning on different groups within the electorate (target voters in target 
seats).  As this happens, it could be argued that the traditional agent and the traditional 
constituency campaign are gradually being superseded.  
 
Here, however, we now go on to discuss agents and their role in recent elections on the basis 
of data collected in 1992, 1997 and 2001. First, we consider the social characteristics of 
agents. Basically we are seeking to answer the question ‘who are agents?’ and to consider, in 
particular, whether they are drawn from the same demographic groups that are regularly 
found to have relatively high levels of political participation. Secondly we consider the extent 
of agent ‘professionalisation’ in an era in which there are fewer full-time members of this 
‘profession’. Finally, we consider whether agents take a strategic and rational approach to 
their role, given that inevitably some will be working in constituencies where their candidates 
are effectively assured of either victory, or of defeat. 
 
Who are the agents? 
As noted previously, very little is known about the characteristics of election agents.  In this 
section, therefore, we provide some evidence describing the sex, age, education and 
occupation of the different types of agents in the major parties.  The data are derived from a 
series of surveys of election agents carried out immediately following the general elections of 
1992, 1997 and 2001.
4
   The principal aim of the surveys was to gather information about the 
nature and intensity of campaigning in the constituencies, but at the same time they also 
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provide information about the kind of people who were agents, their experience and training 
and their views on the efficacy of campaigning.  We show first, in Table 1, the numbers of 
respondents of each type from each of the parties.
5
 
 
[Table 1 About Here] 
 
 
Two points need to be made about these figures in the light of the general trends discussed 
above.  First, the numbers of Conservative permanent agents seem rather large by comparison 
with those suggested in our earlier discussion, certainly in 1992 and 2001.  There are two 
reasons for this.  Full-time agents were probably more likely to respond to the surveys than 
voluntary agents and, in addition, our figures include those permanently employed by local 
parties on a part-time basis whereas figures reported in the Nuffield studies and elsewhere are 
likely to take ‘full-time’ more literally.  
 
Second, the figures for Labour may appear to under-represent special organisers. It should be 
remembered, however, that special organisers frequently acted as advisors rather than being 
agents themselves.  In 1997 and 2001 we asked a separate question about whether campaigns 
were allocated a special organiser and 43 and 56 voluntary Labour agents respectively 
reported that their campaigns were assisted by a special organiser.  
 
In general, however, there are clear differences between the parties.  Although the numbers of 
permanent Conservative agents clearly declined over the period, there were many more than 
in the other parties.  Permanent Labour agents also declined in number but, unsurprisingly, 
the Liberal Democrats always had fewest.  In all parties, however, ‘other paid agents’ begin 
to appear from 1997.  Even so, volunteers always form the vast majority of agents for Labour 
and Liberal Democrat candidates. It is worth noting, however, that permanent and paid agents 
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are concentrated in seats that are held by the party concerned and ‘target’ or ‘key’ seats which 
are likely to see a close result.  In 2001, for example, 87% of the Conservatives’ paid agents, 
94% of Labour’s and 65% of the Liberal Democrats’ were in held or target seats.  
 
We turn next to the socio-demographic characteristics of agents.  Although the numbers 
involved are not large, acting as an agent is an intense form of political participation (Fisher 
and Webb, 2003) and we would expect that the demographic profile of agents would be 
similar to that of others having high levels of political activity.   In other words, as Fisher and 
Webb (2003) found in their study of Labour Party employees, we would expect agents to be 
drawn from socio-demographic groups with higher levels of resources – for example: time, 
experience - and also higher levels of political efficacy. Table 2 provides information about 
the sex and age of agents in the three elections considered here. 
 
[Table 2 About Here] 
 
Overall, men greatly outnumber women among election agents.  Upwards of three-quarters of 
Labour and Liberal Democrat agents have been men at each of the three elections for which 
figures are available.  The Conservatives, on the other hand, have been significantly more 
receptive than the other parties to female agents
6 
(despite the difficulties that Central Office 
has experienced in trying to get local associations to adopt women candidates in winnable 
seats).  This may reflect the fact that women form a relatively large proportion of 
Conservative party members – around 49% according to survey data from the early 1990s 
(Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson 1994: 43) as compared with 39% of Labour members (Seyd & 
Whiteley, 2002: 35) and 47% of Liberal Democrats, also in the early 1990s (Bennie et al., 
1996: 137).  Although the trends are not statistically significant, there are signs in the data 
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that women are becoming more involved as permanent agents.  In all three parties, the 
proportion of males among this category has declined over the period.  
 
Considering the data on age, it is perhaps not surprising that, on average, the oldest group in 
every case is voluntary agents.
7
  In many constituencies the job is taken on by retired people 
– indeed, in all three elections many retired full-time agents continued to act in a voluntary 
capacity for the Conservatives.  Permanent agents are clearly younger, on average, and there 
is some evidence that both the Conservatives and Labour have used nationally appointed 
agents and special organisers to bring in a somewhat younger group of experts.  There is little 
difference between the parties in terms of agents’ ages but Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
might have some cause for concern in that the average age of their agents increased 
significantly between 1992 and 2001. 
 
[Table 3 About Here] 
 
Table 3 shows the proportions of agents with degrees.  As a group, election agents are much 
more highly educated than the general population (among whom 19.7 percent had a degree or 
degree-equivalent qualification at the time of the 2001 census) and than members of their 
respective parties.  In the early 1990s only 12 per cent of Conservative members had 
university degrees (Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson, 1994: 44) while towards the end of the 
decade 34 per cent of Labour members were graduates (Seyd & Whiteley, 2002: 34). .  
Liberal Democrat agents are, by some way, the most likely to have had higher education and 
the differences between the parties are statistically significant for each election.  In all three 
parties, however, the proportions with degrees are almost always largest among other paid 
agents, suggesting that the recruitment of relatively young graduates to organise and manage 
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constituency campaigns was a common response to the need for effective campaigning in the 
1990s. 
 
[Table 4 About Here] 
 
Finally in this section, Table 4 shows the occupational status of voluntary agents.  The pattern 
is much as would be expected.  For all three parties, the majority – usually a substantial 
majority – of voluntary agents have professional and administrative or white collar 
backgrounds.  These sorts of people are most likely to bring to the job the kinds of 
organisational skills and experience required.  Only small proportions of agents are manual 
workers.  This is so even in the Labour party, where the proportion of manual workers has 
fallen significantly over the period – a trend which mirrors the decline of manual workers 
among Labour party members in general (Seyd & Whiteley, 2002: 35). 
 
Summarising drastically, we can say that the typical voluntary agent is likely to be a man, 
over 50, on balance likely to have a degree and to have a professional, administrative or 
white-collar occupation.  Permanent agents are likely to be around 10 years younger, but less 
likely to have a degree.  Special organisers are likely to be younger still, but more likely than 
either voluntary or full-time agents to have a degree.  More generally our speculation that 
agents would mirror other high-participation groups is confirmed – men, the middle-aged, 
those with high levels of education and those from business and professional occupations are 
over-represented among agents. Indeed, in the case of the latter, this is becoming even more 
pronounced. These findings are in line with Fisher and Webb (2003), who found that Labour 
employees in general were most likely to be middle class and have a degree. Agents, then, 
like employees (or at least, Labour employees), follow the same patterns in terms of 
predictors of activity as other more conventional forms of political participation.  
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Experience and Training 
We have suggested that the occupational background of voluntary agents is likely to be a 
significant source of expertise but two other important sources, for both voluntary and full-
time agents, are experience and training.   
 
Clearly agents who have had previous experience of organising election campaigns will have 
a better idea of what is involved, and be more skilled in all aspects of campaigning.  Table 5 
provides information about the previous campaigning experience of agents and, overall, the 
figures suggest that the agents of the major parties have become increasingly experienced.  
Only the data for Conservative voluntary agents show no significant increase over the three 
elections although their agents have usually been somewhat more experienced than those of 
either of the other two parties.  As we have seen, the number of full-time Conservative agents 
has declined quite sharply over the period and if, as seems likely, the more senior and more 
experienced agents were the ones retiring, this would tend to counteract any trend towards 
greater experience.  One further point, not shown in the table, is worth making.  Both the 
Conservatives and Labour made significant numbers of appointments in the category we have 
labelled ‘other paid agents’ for the 1997 election.  In most cases the Conservative appointees 
were centrally-appointed agents, whereas the Labour ones were special organisers drafted 
into key constituencies.  But both groups were relatively inexperienced – only 36 per cent of 
Conservative and 39 per cent of Labour other paid agents had previously organised a 
campaign.  By 2001, however, these figures had risen to 63 per cent for Conservatives and 70 
per cent for Labour.  Presumably many of the people appointed in 1997 were either still in 
post or had been reappointed, so that the numbers with no experience fell substantially. 
 
[Table 6 About Here] 
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Apart from appointing as agents people who bring expertise from their occupational 
backgrounds or who have previous experience of organising elections, the other main way in 
which the national parties can improve the expertise of their agents is by providing training in 
campaign organisation and techniques.  This has always been done, of course, but as the 
focus on constituency campaigning has increased over the past fifteen years or so, the parties 
have put renewed efforts into training.  Since it was clear from the early 1990s, as the 
ownership and use of personal computers became widespread, that this new technology 
would have significant applications in campaigning, we asked in all three surveys not just 
about training in general campaigning techniques but also more specifically about training in 
the use of computers for campaigning.   
 
Table 6 shows the proportions of the different types of agents saying that they attended party-
organised courses giving general training in campaigning over the previous 5 years as well as 
the proportions of all agents who received training in the use of computers.  In terms of 
general training, the proportions reporting that they received some training are consistently 
very large.  The figures are almost always well over 60 per cent, and for permanent and other 
paid agents generally around 90 per cent.   Of course, the figures tell us nothing about the 
nature or extent of the training, but it is clear that all three parties were putting considerable 
effort into improving the expertise of their agents, with the Conservatives generally training 
more of their agents than the other parties.  The figures for all agents show a significant 
downward trend from 1992 in all parties and it seems likely that this is because, as we have 
seen, agents were in general becoming more experienced so that in many cases training 
would not need to be repeated. 
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The figures for training in the use of computers also show a significant and quite sharp 
decline from 1992 onwards.  There are probably a number of factors at work here.  By the 
middle 1990s the ownership of personal computers was becoming widespread and their use 
in offices almost universal.  The need for training, certainly among voluntary agents would 
therefore be likely to reduce.  But in any case, agents might well delegate the campaign’s 
computer tasks to another member of the campaign team who was particularly adept or 
experienced in the use of computers.  Certainly other evidence does not suggest that local 
campaigns were suffering from a lack of computer expertise: the proportions of all campaigns 
making use of computers rose from 74 per cent in 1992, to 85 per cent in 1997 and 89 per 
cent in 2001 (Denver et al, 2003: 550). 
 
The evidence presented in this section suggests that although Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats rely heavily on voluntary agents, and the Conservatives increasingly do so, all 
three parties have taken steps to build up the expertise of agents as a whole.   They have been 
increasingly successful in retaining the services of agents with previous experience and they 
have organised training for impressive proportions of agents, whether voluntary, permanent 
or special organisers. Arguably, this is consistent with the ‘post-Fordism’ thesis advanced by 
Denver and Hands (2002). Rather than relying on relatively unskilled labour to perform the 
role of agents, all parties have tried to ensure that their body of agents, whether paid or 
unpaid, have become highly trained and skilled in the use of the high technology equipment 
necessary for modern election campaigns. 
 
The effectiveness and purposes of constituency campaigning 
The surveys of agents from which the data discussed in the preceding sections are derived 
were used to construct a measure of campaign intensity for each party in each constituency 
on the basis of information about campaign activities supplied by respondents (see Denver 
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and Hands, 1997: 246-55).  In addition, however, we also asked agents to evaluate the impact 
of their own campaigns on the election outcome in their constituency (although these 
evaluations did not form part of the measure of campaign intensity).  Table 7 shows the 
proportions of agents claiming that their campaigns made ‘a great deal’ of difference to the 
number of votes that their party obtained according to the target status of their constituency.
8
   
 
One might expect to find some exaggeration here – most people will experience some 
psychological resistance to admitting that activities into which they have put considerable 
effort have little impact - but the pattern of responses makes reasonably good sense.  Agents 
in seats that were not held and not targeted (mostly hopeless prospects for the party 
concerned) were least likely to think that their efforts made a great deal of difference.
9
 
Labour and the Liberal Democrat respondents in target seats are most likely to believe that 
campaigning had a payoff while among Conservatives it is agents in the safest seats who are 
most likely to have a positive view of the electoral effects of campaigning.  This may appear 
odd, but we have shown elsewhere that the Conservatives mounted their best campaigns in 
these seats, at least in 1992 and 1997 (Denver et al, 2003).  In addition, the very low figures 
for the Conservatives in all types of seats in 1997 suggests that, in the face of the Labour 
landslide in that election, Conservative agents believed that it was impossible to stem the tide 
no matter how well they campaigned.  Finally, Liberal Democrat agents in hopeless seats (not 
held and not targeted) were clearly realistic about the impact that their (usually weak) 
campaigns had on the constituency result. All of this suggests that as ‘electoral professionals’ 
agents have a relatively sophisticated view of the effectiveness of their own efforts. This 
potentially distinguishes them from more regular partisans. 
 
[Table 7 About Here] 
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We also asked agents about the aims and purposes of their campaigns.  A straightforward  
electoral maximizing view of campaigning would suggest that the purpose is simply to win 
votes and seats.  On this view, it is rational to concentrate resources on target constituencies 
and run minimal campaigns elsewhere and the parties have increasingly followed this logic. 
What may appear rational to political scientists or to central party professionals may not be so 
rational from an agent’s perspective, however.  After all, a traditional academic view of 
constituency campaigning was that it was largely a ritual that kept party members happy 
(Kavanagh, 1970: 78-9).  Even if this view was ever correct, it is now almost entirely wrong, 
at least in the eyes of agents.  We asked agents whether, apart from gaining as many votes as 
possible, their campaigns had any other major aims, and if so what they were: barely eight   
per cent of agents mentioned boosting party morale in 1992 and by 2001 this figure had fallen 
to less than one per cent.  
 
Nonetheless, the figures reported in Table 8 suggest that relatively few agents take a wholly 
electoral-maximizing view of campaigns.  Although there is a decline in the proportions of 
Labour and Liberal Democrat agents mentioning other aims over the period, large majorities  
of agents in all parties claim that their campaigns have purposes other than maximising votes.  
Although their campaigns tend to have the least impact on party performance (Denver et al., 
2004), Conservative agents are the least likely to say that they have additional aims and the 
differences between the parties are statistically significant at each election. 
 
[Table 8 About Here] 
 
If campaigns are not just about winning votes, what other purposes do they serve?  A number 
of common themes emerge from responses to an open-ended question - to publicise the party, 
promote policies, contact the electorate, boost party morale, keep the opposition busy, raise 
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funds, improve organisation, come second, increase membership and prepare for the local 
elections.  However, only the latter two aims are mentioned in any numbers, or with any 
regularity.  Details are given in Table 9.  Agents in all parties clearly view election campaigns 
as an opportunity to recruit party members.  Canvassing helps to identify supporters and in 
the excitement of an election campaign it is easier than usual to persuade at least some of 
these to sign up as members.  The data also suggest that agents increasingly view general 
election campaigns as an opportunity to campaign also for forthcoming (or contemporaneous) 
local elections.
10
 The traditional view has been the reverse – that local election campaigns 
assist in the build up to a general election.  What the data suggest, however, is that agents 
may be becoming more sophisticated electoral maximizers. The purpose is to win votes, 
whether at local or constituency level; and there may be an increasing appreciation that the 
election of local councillors (as well as recruiting new members) may provide a springboard 
for subsequent success at general elections.  It is noteworthy that Liberal Democrats are most 
likely to offer this response given that a feature of Liberal Democrat success at parliamentary 
level has been preceding success in relevant local elections (MacAllister et al, 2002). 
 
[Table 9 About Here] 
 
 
Conclusion 
The discussion presented here has suggested a number of important developments in the 
organisation of constituency election campaigns.  To start with, we have confirmed the 
already well-documented decline of the traditional full-time agent.  He (mostly) or she was 
someone employed on a permanent basis by a local party to maintain the party’s organisation 
between elections and then take charge of organising the campaign when the general election 
was called.  In their heyday election agents could lay claim to professional status – they were 
trained in particular skills to carry out a distinct set of tasks.  But at least since 1950 numbers 
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of full-time agents have declined steadily and this no longer seems a viable model for 
bringing expertise to constituency campaigns.   
 
As we have argued here and elsewhere, however, the traditional mould of constituency 
campaigning has been broken over the past ten years or so – at least in the all-important 
target constituencies.  The parties have woken up to the potential of constituency 
campaigning and in different ways have been looking for new organisational models to 
realise that potential.  A campaign organisation centred on the traditional agent no longer 
suffices – and such agents probably only survive because of the continuing legal 
requirements that each candidate must appoint one.  We have suggested that the notion of 
flexible specialisation associated with the post-Fordist model of the process of production 
may shed some light on these changes.  Whether it does or not, we can expect further 
significant changes over future elections.  Ironically, perhaps, the ‘heroic’ role of election 
agents is only being celebrated as it becomes obsolete.  
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Table 1: Numbers of agents responding to surveys (row %) 
 
 Permanent Other Voluntary Total 
 agents paid agents agents 
  
Conservative 
 1992 181 (69%) *  81  (31%) 262 
 1997 163 (38%) 83 (19%) 180 (42%) 426 
 2001 136 (37%) 43 (12%) 189 (51%) 368 
 
Labour 
 1992 44 (12%) *  310 (88%) 354 
 1997 32   (7%) 31 (7%) 382 (86%) 445 
 2001 24 (5%) 23 (5%) 392 (89%) 439 
 
Liberal Democrat 
 1992 22 (6%) *  338 (94%) 360 
 1997 16 (4%) 7 (2%) 382  (94%) 405 
 2001 17 (4%) 9 (2%) 399 (94%) 425 
 
Note:  * The relevant question was not asked in 1992.  ‘Permanent agents’ means full-time or part-
time agents employed by the local party.  ‘Other paid agents’ refers to agents or special organisers 
employed by the national party to work in the constituency, or other organisers seconded by MPs, 
MEPs or trade unions. 
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Table 2: Sex and age of agents 
 Permanent Other Voluntary 
 agents paid agents agents All 
Sex (% male) 
  Conservative 
 1992 65 * 65 65 
 1997 63 68 70 67 
 2001 61 58 73 67 
 
  Labour 
 1992 86 * 79 80 
 1997 81 65 75 75 
 2001 67 78 76 76 
 
  Lib Dem 
 1992 76 * 78 78 
 1997 60 43 76 75 
 2001 53 78 79 78 
 
Mean Age 
 Conservative 
 1992 44.4 * 56.9 48.3 
 1997 45.3 41.3 54.8 48.5 
 2001 48.2 41.0 54.9 50.8 
 
 Labour 
 1992 41.0 * 46.6 45.9 
 1997 42.2 40.0 50.1 48.6 
 2001 46.0 41.2 51.2 50.4 
 
 Lib Dem 
 1992 37.0 * 46.9 46.1 
 1997 36.5 44.4 49.2 48.6 
 2001 41.2 44.1 52.4 51.6 
 
Note: Ns as in Table 1. 
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Table 3: Education of agents (% with degree) 
  Permanent Other Voluntary 
  agents paid agents agents All 
 
Conservative 
 1992 41 * 48 43 
 1997 35 48 46 42 
 2001 42 59 47 47 
 
Labour 
 1992 48 * 52 51 
 1997 50 77 52 54 
 2001 54 70 58 59 
 
Lib Dem 
 1992 67 * 62 64 
 1997 67 86 64 65 
 2001 82 78 65 66 
 
Note: Ns as in Table 1. 
 
Table 4: Occupational status of voluntary agents (row %) 
 Business Professional Manual 
 & management & administrative workers 
 
Conservative 
 1992 25 63 5 
 1997 24 63 4 
 2001 35 51 8 
Labour 
 1992 13 65 20 
 1997 14 70 10 
 2001 17 62 7 
Lib Dem 
 1992 27 61 7 
 1997 26 60 10 
 2001 23 69 5 
 
Note: Ns as in Table 1. 
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Table 5: Previous experience of agents (% having previously organised at least one general 
election campaign) 
 Conservative Labour Liberal Democrats 
 All Voluntary  All Voluntary All Voluntary 
 agents agents agents agents agents agents 
1992 58 54 38 35 35 35 
1997 51 44 38 37 43 43 
2001 63 47 50 48 47 49 
 
Note: Ns as in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 6: General training (and computer training) of agents (% attending courses) 
 Permanent Other Voluntary All 
 agents paid agents agents agents 
 
Conservative 
 1992 91 - 78 87 (51) 
 1997 82 92 70 78 (39) 
 2001 79 93 57 69 (24) 
 
Labour 
 1992 96 - 77 79 (36) 
 1997 88 90 69 72 (21) 
 2001 88 87 66 68 (20) 
 
Lib Dem 
 1992 91 - 71 72 (21) 
 1997 100 71 60 62 (12) 
 2001 94 89 62 64 (13) 
 
Note: Ns as in Table 1.  The figures in brackets are the percentages of all agents who attended 
computer training courses. 
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Table 7: Perceptions of effectiveness of campaigns (% thinking their campaign made ‘a great deal’ of 
difference) 
 
 Held/ Target Not held/ 
 not target  not target 
 
Conservative 
 1992 43 30 30 
 1997 25 19 18 
 2001 44 33 13 
 
Labour 
 1992 38 49 37 
 1997 34 53 46 
 2001 28 47 25 
 
Lib Dem 
 1992 - 52 8 
 1997 - 78 12 
 2001 60 59 9 
 
Note: The numbers of respondents in held/not target, target and not held/not target seats were as 
follows: Conservative 135, 45, 82 (1992); 164, 63, 199 (1997); 122, 101, 145 (2001): Labour 97, 
95, 162 (1992); 168, 63, 214 (1997); 183, 96, 160 (2001); Liberal Democrat 0, 31, 329 (1992); 1, 
28, 376 (1997); 10, 32, 383 (2001). 
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Table 8:  Campaigns having aims other than maximising votes (%) 
 Held/ Target Not held/ All 
 not target  not target 
 
Conservative 
 1992 58 53 78 63 
 1997 63 51 61 60 
 2001 61 53 63 60 
 
Labour 
 1992 70 59 93 78 
 1997 76 71 81 78 
 2001 66 57 80 69 
 
Lib Dem 
 1992 - 74 94 92 
 1997 - 68 88 87 
 2001 70 66 79 78 
 
Note: For Ns see note 5. 
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Table 9: Most frequently mentioned ‘other’ aims of campaigns (%) 
 Increase Prepare for 
 membership local elections 
 
Conservative 
 1992 31 12 
 1997 44 17 
 2001 39 27 
 
Labour 
 1992 30 32 
 1997 23 23 
 2001 26 38 
 
Liberal Democrat 
 1992 62 33 
 1997 42 41 
 2001 36 51 
 
Note: Percentages are of respondents reporting that they had another aim in addition to maximising 
votes.  Ns for the respective elections are 148, 249 and 209 for Conservatives, 260, 333 and 291 for 
Labour and 327, 342 and 325 for Liberal Democrats. 
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Notes 
1. The only exceptions are likely to be in cases where an entirely nominal campaign is 
mounted because the electoral prospects are very poor and party organisation virtually 
non-existent.  The law still requires the appointment of an agent in such cases but the 
person appointed may not do very much beyond signing the necessary forms and turning 
up for the counting of votes. 
 
2. The Nuffield study of the 1950 general election contains some interesting information on 
agents at that time (Nicholas, 1951: 22-41) while Denver and Hands (1997: 325) provide 
a single table showing the characteristics of agents responding to their 1992 survey.  
 
3. These figures may well underestimate the numbers of constituency parties having the 
services of a full-time agent since it was common, particularly in the Labour party, for a 
single agent to have responsibility for more than one constituency, especially in cities.  
Except where otherwise noted, the figures for full-time agents given in this and later 
paragraphs are derived from the relevant Nuffield study and, for recent elections, 
interviews with party organisers. 
 
4. The surveys were conducted in connection with ESRC-supported studies of constituency 
campaigning.  The grant reference numbers are Y304 25 3004 (1992); R000222027 
(1997) and R000239396 (2001). 
 
5. In what follows we use the term ‘permanent agents’ to refer to those permanently 
employed on a full-time or part-time basis by the local party.  The collective term ‘other 
paid agents’ is used to refer to those appointed on national contracts, researchers or 
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assistants to MPs or MEPs seconded to act as agents, or special organisers appointed on 
short-term contracts for the period leading up to and including the election campaign.  
 
6. For each year, the difference between the Conservatives and the other parties in respect 
of the proportion of males is statistically significant on the basis of chi-squared tests. 
 
7. Using ANOVA to compare means, the differences between volunteers and the other 
categories are significant in each case.  The differences between elections for all Labour 
and Liberal Democrat agents are also significant – they are becoming significantly older. 
 
8. In planning their election campaigns all parties draw up lists of ‘target’ constituencies – 
those where they are likely to be involved in a close battle for victory – in which special 
campaigning efforts are made.   
 
9. Differences in the proportions in the three categories are statistically significant for the 
Conservatives in 2001, for Labour in 1997 and 2001 and for the Liberal Democrats in all 
three elections. 
 
10. In 1992 local elections across much of Britain followed one month after the general 
election.  In both 1997 and 2001 there were local elections in some parts of the country 
on the same day as the general election. 
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